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Prior studies document that board directors who fail to act as effective monitors of 
management are penalized by the labor market in the form of fewer subsequent board seats. 
However, there is little evidence on how the market rewards directors for exceptional 
advising and monitoring on corporate boards. In this paper, I use national director awards 
as a positive shock to directors’ reputations and examine changes in board seats for award-
winning directors. Award-winning directors gain more board seats than non-winning 
directors, both after and before the awards. Event study tests suggest that the quality of 
award-winning directors may have been revealed to the labor market before the awards but 
not to the broader stock market. Stock market reactions to appointments of award-winning 
directors are positive and statistically significant only after the awards, not before. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Outside directors are expected to monitor and advise management on behalf of 
shareholders. But what motivates them to perform their tasks effectively? Fama and 
Jensen (1983) hypothesize that “outside directors have incentives to develop reputations 
as experts in decision control…They use their directorships to signal to internal and 
external markets for decision agents that they are decision experts” (p. 315). The finance 
literature provides extensive empirical support for this conjecture, mostly focusing on 
whether directors are penalized for failing to act as effective monitors of management. 
However, there is little evidence on whether the director labor market rewards outside 
directors for strong performance on corporate boards.  
The primary reason for the lack of evidence on the reward side of the director 
labor market is that there are few observable positive shocks to directors’ reputations. In 
contrast, negative shocks to reputations are much more visible (e.g., bankruptcies, hostile 
takeovers, earnings restatements, shareholder lawsuits, option backdating scandals, proxy 
contests). Multiple studies document that these negative reputational shocks result in 
fewer subsequent directorships for outside directors (Gilson, 1990; Harford, 2003; 
Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014).
1
 On the other 
hand, only a study by Coles and Hoi (2003) analyzes a positive shock to reputation, 
examining the decision to opt out of state-mandated anti-takeover provisions by 
Pennsylvania boards. These anti-takeover provisions were perceived to be detrimental to 
firm value; Pennsylvania firms’ cumulative abnormal returns from the introduction to the 
                                                 
1
 One exception to these results is Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012). The authors find that directors of 
option backdating firms do not suffer loss of board seats at other firms.  
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enactment of these provisions were -9.09% (Szewczyk and Tsetsekos, 1992). Coles and 
Hoi find that outside directors who reject all provisions, thus acting in the shareholders’ 
best interests, are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships as 
directors who retain all provisions. There are two key advantages of this setting: first, the 
decision to opt out of anti-takeover provisions clearly falls within the board’s purview, 
and second, by opting out the firm’s shareholder value is protected from negative stock 
market reactions.  
In this paper, I use national awards for corporate directors as the setting to 
investigate the implications of the reward side of the director labor market, specifically 
whether award-winning directors gain more board seats than non-winning directors. 
Awards are given to directors with outstanding performance in a number of board roles, 
in both advising and monitoring functions, such as leading the board through mergers and 
acquisitions, providing strategic vision and advice, or improving financial reporting and 
disclosures. The advantage of this setting is that these accomplishments are more 
representative of the typical responsibilities of the board, compared to the one-off 
decision of opting out of anti-takeover provisions. On the other hand, there is no 
definitive evidence that these accomplishments are value-enhancing for shareholders, 
since there are only a few accomplishments with clear event dates to perform event 
studies. To mitigate this concern, I examine the firm’s stock performance during the year 
of the director’s accomplishment. The average cumulative return during this year is 
25.8% for firms that nominate award-winning directors, whereas the average return 
during the same year for other S&P 500 firms is 15.6%. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
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The director awards setting offers several additional advantages in studying the 
director labor market. First, awards are given to individual directors, not the whole board. 
This feature allows me to cleanly isolate the reputational shock to a single director, using 
other outside directors on the same board as benchmarks. Using firm fixed effects in 
regressions controls for any firm-specific characteristics that may be driving the 
subsequent gain in board seats for award-winning directors. For example, firms with 
more frequent mergers and acquisitions activities provide their directors with critical 
experiences that may be valuable to other firms (Harford and Schonlau, 2013).  
 Second, this setting allows me to distinguish supply and demand effects on labor 
market outcomes. Disentangling whether any increase or decrease in board seats is due to 
the supply side or the demand side of the labor market has been a challenge for previous 
studies. For example, directors of companies sued by shareholders may have fewer future 
board seats either because companies force them to resign from the boards, or because 
directors voluntarily resign to minimize future legal exposure. Likewise, directors of 
better performing firms may gain more board seats because (i) there is an increase in 
demand for their services, or (ii) demand always existed, but now there is a shift in 
supply of director’s time. The challenge in interpretation is due to the fact that 
researchers cannot observe the number of directorships offered, only the number of 
directorships accepted. In my setting, it is possible that after successful turnarounds, 
restructurings, spin-offs, or sales of the companies, award-winning directors would have 
more free time, but so would other outside directors on the same boards. If any increase 
in board seats is purely driven by the supply side, I would not observe any difference in 
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change in board seats between award-winning directors and non-winning directors on the 
same boards. 
Further evidence on the reward side is important in assessing the functioning of 
the director labor market. To provide the proper incentives for directors to perform, the 
labor market needs to demonstrate that not only poor performance is punished but also 
that strong performance is rewarded, i.e., a “stick and carrot” approach. This has been 
documented in the executive labor market as well as the mutual fund industry. 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) show that “superstar” CEOs, those who win awards for 
strong firm performance, are rewarded with higher compensation after the awards. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that mutual fund managers who had better than 
average performance tend to have greater total assets under management afterwards. 
Deuskar, Pollet, Wang and Zheng (2011) find that top-performing mutual fund managers 
are rewarded by being allowed to run side-by-side hedge funds, which offer managers a 
more lucrative compensation structure than mutual funds. 
I use a sample of 89 directors who have been awarded either Outstanding Director 
by the Outstanding Directors Exchange (ODX) or Director of the Year by the National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) from 1999 to 2009. I find that award-
winning directors gain more board seats than their non-winning cohorts over a three year 
period from the year immediately before the awards to two years after the awards. To 
address endogeneity concerns, I control for potential confounding firm effects by 
comparing award-winning directors to non-winning outside directors on the same boards, 
using firm fixed effects in multivariate regressions.  
 5 
 
One distinct feature of the director awards setting is that due to the nominating 
and vetting process for selecting award recipients, the actual accomplishments of award-
winning directors typically occur two years before the year awards are presented. In some 
cases, this period can reach three or four years, which is due to the necessity of observing 
the final outcome of a turnaround or restructuring. This lag between the actual 
accomplishments and awards provides an opportunity to examine an implication of the 
director labor market not tested before in the literature, whether the labor market relies on 
private information among directors to make board appointment decisions. If that is true, 
directors’ qualities may have been revealed to the labor market even before award 
winners are chosen, and thus these award-winning directors may already gain additional 
board seats before their external recognition. As a result, any observable difference in 
board seats between award-winning directors and non-winning directors after the awards 
may underestimate the true effect of the revelation of the quality of the award-winning 
directors.  
To investigate this issue, I examine press coverage preceding the year of the 
award to identify the actual timing of the director’s accomplishment. I examine the 
change in board seats for award-winning directors from one year before the 
accomplishment to one year before the award, matched to cohorts based on age and 
number of prior directorships at the beginning of the period. I find that award-winning 
directors also gain more board seats than non-winning directors during this pre-award 
period, consistent with the conjecture that the qualities of award-winning directors have 
already been revealed to the director labor market.  
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To examine whether the qualities of award-winning directors are also revealed to 
the stock market, I perform event studies of appointments of award-winning directors and 
matched non-winning directors during three different periods: before the 
accomplishment, from the accomplishment to the award, and after the award. The results 
of this exercise reveal that investors react favorably only to announcements of 
appointments of award-winning directors and only in the period after the award.  Investor 
reactions to announcements in the pre-award period (either before or after the 
accomplishment) are close to zero. Taken together, these results provide some supportive 
evidence that the director labor market relies on private information to make its board 
appointment decisions. 
Even though I also use a setting of national awards, my study differs from the 
Malmendier and Tate’s paper along several dimensions. First, they use CEO awards to 
study how shifts in reputation allow CEOs to become more entrenched in their jobs, 
engage in more outside activities and shirk their core responsibilities, which result in 
poorer future performance for the firms. Alternatively, I examine the direct impact of 
directors’ awards on their career opportunities, or in other words, whether proper 
incentives exist for directors to exert extra time and effort in their roles. Second, 
Malmendier and Tate use propensity score matching to construct a sample of “predicted” 
winners – CEOs who did not win awards but are otherwise similar to award-winners. 
While there is only one CEO per firm, there are multiple outside directors on one board, 
allowing me to use the non-winning directors on the same board as the comparison 
group. Finally, CEO awards are selected by the media based on publicly available 
information, whereas public information is only used for initial screening in the director 
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awards selection process. Eventual winners of director awards are determined from 
nominations and endorsements by fellow directors, using private information that is 
unobservable to outsiders. 
 My paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First and foremost, it 
provides supportive evidence of a well-functioning market for directorships, specifically 
that directors with exceptional performance in typical board roles are subsequently 
rewarded with additional board seats. Second, it complements the literature on the 
advising role of directors. A recent number of studies analyzes the advising role of 
certain types of board members: CEO directors (Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2010), 
multinational directors (Naveen, Daniel, and McConnell, 2013), directors with 
experience in supplier industries or customer industries of the firm (Dass, Kini, Nanda, 
Onal, and Wang, 2014), and venture capitalists (Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan, 2013). In 
this paper, I show that the majority of awards recognize directors’ accomplishments in 
advising management, and these directors tend to gain more board seats than directors 
with monitoring accomplishments.  This is consistent with anecdotal evidence and board 
surveys suggesting that directors are valued for their advice and counsel. Third, my paper 
provides empirical evidence suggesting that the director labor market is operating on 
private information among fellow directors, a potentially important channel of the labor 
market not studied previously in the literature. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature as well as 
institutional details of the awards selection process. Section 3 describes the data and the 
sample selection process. Section 4 presents the results of my univariate tests as well as 
multivariate regression analyses, and section 5 concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
DIRECTOR AWARDS AND THE MARKET FOR DIRECTORSHIPS 
2.1. The market for directorships 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the labor market can provide 
additional incentives, besides direct compensation, for managers and directors to perform 
through the process of ex post settling up. If outside opportunities for managers and 
directors are sensitive to their on-the-job performance, then they will be motivated to act 
in the best interests of shareholders. The prior literature has attempted to document 
empirical evidence regarding this conjecture, primarily focusing on how the labor market 
penalizes directors who did not act in shareholders’ best interests or failed in their role as 
monitors of management.  Gilson (1990) studies directors of companies that either go 
bankrupt or privately restructure their debt; he finds that directors who resign from these 
firms following the bankruptcy or debt restructuring hold significantly fewer board seats 
following their departure. Harford (2003) examines the consequences for directors of 
poor performing firms that become targets of takeover offers. The directors who reject a 
takeover offer are penalized by the market in the form of fewer future directorships, 
whereas the directors who accept do not face this penalty. Srinivasan (2005) finds that 
outside directors, particularly those serving on audit committees, are much more likely to 
leave the boards of firms that restate earnings. He also finds a decline in other board seats 
for these directors. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) study the reputation of outside directors 
on boards of firms that are targets of shareholder lawsuits for financial fraud. The authors 
find that these directors also suffer reputational penalties, facing a significant decline in 
the number of future board seats.  
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Most recently, Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) examine directors who are targets of 
proxy contests by activist investors. They document findings consistent with the prior 
literature: these directors suffer reputational losses from being revealed as poor monitors, 
thus they have fewer directorships in the three years following the proxy contests. These 
results still hold when the authors use as benchmarks outside directors who are on the 
same boards but not up for election that year (i.e., due to the staggered election feature of 
a classified board). The use of directors on the same board as the comparison group is 
very similar to the identification strategy I adopt in this study. Taken together, previous 
empirical findings suggest a well-functioning labor market for directorships with regards 
to penalizing directors for poor performance. However, it is much less clear as to how the 
labor market views directors who are strong monitors or advisers of management.   
 One single study by Coles and Hoi (2003) analyzes a positive shock to directors’ 
reputation. The authors look at the decision to opt out of state-mandated anti-takeover 
provisions by Pennsylvania boards. They argue that by opting out, directors reveal 
themselves to be strong monitors who act in the best interests of shareholders. The 
authors find that the outside directors who reject anti-takeover provisions are three times 
more likely to gain additional external directorships than directors who do not. However, 
there still remain several questions unanswered regarding the functioning of the labor 
market for directors. How does the market recognize and reward directors who perform 
well in the more typical tasks associated with the board such as CEO succession and 
hiring, CEO compensation setting, or mergers and acquisitions? Does the market favor 
directors with strong advising ability or those with higher monitoring intensity? Harford 
and Schonlau (2013) examine one decision particularly within the purview of the board: 
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mergers and acquisitions. The authors find that with regards to prior mergers and 
acquisitions experience, the director labor market does not function as expected. CEOs 
and directors with acquisition experience, regardless of whether the acquisitions are 
value-enhancing or value-destroying, gain more board seats subsequent to the 
acquisitions. In this case, experience seems be more valued than ability. 
 Arguing that previous studies tend to focus on extreme circumstances, Yermack 
(2004) studies the incentives for directors in more general market conditions. Yermack 
investigates how a firm’s prior performance influences the change in board seats of 
directors on its board. He finds that one standard deviation outperformance of the market 
for 2 years leads to an increase of 0.2 directorships for each outside director. These 
results are similar to those of Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003), who find that 
past operating margin is associated with a higher number of board seats as well as a 
higher likelihood of being appointed to a new board. While these results do provide some 
answers to the question of whether the labor market rewards directors for effective 
performance, several issues remain that require a more cautious interpretation of the 
results. First, it is ambiguous as to which component of performance is driven by external 
factors and which is under the board’s control. Second, the relationship between past firm 
performance and future change in board seats of directors is complicated by potential 
endogeneity issues. Firms with strong prior performance are more visible to investors and 
analysts. As a result, any increase in directorships for award-winning directors may be 
due to increased visibility instead of effective monitoring. The director awards setting 
allows me to mitigate these endogeneity concerns by including firm fixed effects, 
controlling for time-invariant firm-specific characteristics. 
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2.2. Director awards 
There are a number of organizations and business magazines that award directors 
for outstanding performance on the boards of companies in specific geographical regions 
(e.g. the Corporate Directors Forum in the San Diego area, Utah Business magazine, and 
a number of business journals in large cities). However, in the context of this study, I 
focus exclusively on director awards by prominent national organizations for two main 
reasons: any director can win these awards, and the award is prominent enough to affect 
the reputation of the award-winning director. This is the same rationale used by 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) in their study of CEO awards. 
 Two national organizations evaluate and select directors for awards every year: 
the Outstanding Directors Exchange (ODX), a unit of the Financial Times, and the 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). The ODX’s Outstanding Directors 
Awards program started in 1998, selecting from five to ten directors each year.
2
 The 
award announcements are followed by individual profiles on the award-winning 
directors, detailing the accomplishments of each director on his/her board, complete with 
endorsements from fellow board members and, in some cases, company management. 
These profiles are published in Agenda Week, a weekly corporate governance publication 
sent to board members of the majority of Fortune 1000 firms.
3
 The NACD selects only 
one director each year for its Director of the Year program. Since 2007, the organization 
also started awarding directors of non-profit organizations, directors of private 
companies, and directors with extensive lifetime achievement. For the purpose of this 
                                                 
2
 The list of award winners from prior years can be obtained from http://event.ft-
live.com/ehome/odx2014/128158/  
 
3
 Prior publications of these profiles (before 2008) used the names Director’s Alert or Board Alert. 
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study, however, I focus on the awards for public company directors, specifically those 
that I can obtain a reason or accomplishment for the award, as well as the company at 
which this accomplishment occurred. Throughout this paper, I call these companies 
“nominating companies” because award-winning directors have to be nominated by a 
fellow board member or company executive, and the nomination has to be seconded by 
another independent director on the same board.  
 Since the NACD program only accounts for four observations in my final sample, 
in this paper I will only describe the awards selection process for the ODX’s program, as 
there are no important differences between the two programs. After all nominations are 
received, the ODX selection committee uses a number of initial screens such as 
attendance records, poor relative stock performance, or high relative CEO pay to winnow 
the field down to 10-15 finalists. The selection committee then conducts research into the 
directors’ accomplishments by talking to at least three people who have been long time 
fellow directors with the finalists. The research is presented to an advisory board, which 
consists of prior award winners as well as other prominent executives and academics, 
who offer their feedback on the finalists. Based on its research and feedback from the 
advisory board, the selection committee then chooses five to ten winners from the list of 
finalists. The typical timing for accomplishments is two years before the awards, but in 
some cases this could reach three years if the committee feels the need to wait to observe 
the final outcome of a turnaround or restructuring effort before awarding. The results of 
the awards are publicized, and award winners’ accomplishments are profiled extensively 
in an article.  
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To illustrate, I use the example of Barbara Alexander, who won one of the awards 
in 2003. The article describes her outstanding work as an audit committee member on the 
board of Homestore from 2001 to 2002, raising red flags and starting an internal 
investigation into accounting fraud at the company. Ms. Alexander was selected as an 
Outstanding Director for “her tenacity in ferreting out fraud at Homestore.com.” Even 
though she stepped down from the board of Homestore in 2002, Ms. Alexander joined the 
boards of two other firms in 2004, bringing her total number of directorships to four. 
 There are important differences between the director awards selection process and 
the CEO awards selection process. First, CEO awards are selected by the media based on 
publicly available information. For example, Business Week starts its “Best Manager” 
awards selection process by surveying its editors and writers for nominees. Final winners 
are then selected based on observable outcomes such as stock returns performance or 
successful turnarounds. On the other hand, public information is only used as initial 
screens for the director awards selection process. Because the inner workings of a board 
are “a black box” to outside observers, it is impossible to identify award winners relying 
on public information alone. As a result, winners of director awards are determined from 
qualitative research and interviews with fellow directors, or in other words, private 
information rather than public information. This is advantageous because award-winning 
directors’ qualities are verified and endorsed by other directors.  
The second difference is a longer lag time between actual accomplishments and 
awards in the director awards process.  The advantage of this lag is that it provides an 
opportunity to test an implication of the director labor market not studied before in the 
literature, whether the labor market operates on private information. If the director labor 
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market relies on private information to make board appointment decisions, then some 
directorships may have already been offered to award-winning directors before they 
actually receive the awards. I test for this possibility by examining the change in board 
seats from one year before the accomplishment to one year before the award. In addition, 
I perform event study tests to examine whether information about the qualities of award-
winning directors are also revealed to the stock market before the awards. I compare 
investor reactions to the announcements of appointments of award-winning directors to 
those of non-winning directors on the same boards. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Because I need to track directors’ board service for two years following the 
awards and my directorships data end in 2011, I identify all director awards from 1998 to 
2009. During these years, a total of 121 awards were given by the two organizations. 
However, using a number of filters to ensure that I have the necessary data to conduct my 
analysis, I reduce my sample to 89 awards, 85 by the ODX and 4 by the NACD. The 
reason for the low number of NACD awards included in the sample is that the NACD 
only selects one award recipient each year, and for a number of years I could not obtain 
the accomplishments and the nominating companies for the award-winning directors. 
Table 1A lists all the filters I use as well as the final number of awards included in my 
sample (see appendix A for all figures and tables). The final sample covers awards from 
1999 to 2009. 
 For each of the awards included in my final sample, I read the award 
announcement as well as the accompanying director profile. I then categorize each 
director’s primary accomplishment, cited as the reason for the award, into different 
groups. These categories and the associated number of awards in each category are 
presented in Table 1B. The most common accomplishment for directors is leading their 
companies through difficult times, turnarounds, or restructurings, accounting for 19% of 
the awards. The second most common reason cited for outstanding directors is their role 
in driving a successful spin-off, merger, or acquisition. Overall, the accomplishments 
cited are consistent with the extensive literature on the monitoring role of the board: 
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leadership of audit committees, improving financial reporting and disclosures, setting 
more performance-sensitive CEO compensation.  
The reasons cited are also consistent with the evidence documented in a nascent 
strand of literature focusing on the advising value of directors. Some of these award 
reasons include extensive political background, international experience, scientific or 
technical expertise, or analytical focus. Column 4 of Table 1B divides award categories 
into either Advising or Monitoring. All accomplishments related to work performed by 
the audit committee (improving financial reporting and disclosures), the compensation 
committee (strengthening executive compensation programs), and the nominating 
committee (introducing good corporate governance practices) are categorized under 
monitoring activities. In addition, I also consider managing an effective CEO succession 
or hiring process to be a monitoring function of the board. All other accomplishments are 
classified under advising activities. Using this rationale, 70% of the awards are given for 
exceptional performance in advising management, and the remaining 30% are due to 
effective monitoring.  
To test my hypotheses, I obtain data on the number of directorships from a 
comprehensive dataset that I construct and hand collect from proxy statements, covering 
board service in all US public companies from 1994 to 2011. This dataset has broader 
coverage than the RiskMetrics dataset, which only covers the top 1,500 firms. It also 
contains complete data on all board committee memberships and chairmanships. I obtain 
supplementary data on director characteristics (e.g. director independence, CEO status, 
etc.) from the RiskMetrics and BoardEx databases.  
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 Table 2 presents summary statistics on nominating firms (Panel A) and award-
winning directors (Panel B). Because nominating firms are typically larger, I compare 
them to other firms in the S&P 500.
4
 I investigate the differences between the two groups 
with regards to size and performance measures. Panel A of Table 2 documents the results 
of this comparison. While nominating firms appear to be larger than S&P 500 firms on 
average, only the difference in market cap between the two groups is statistically 
significant.  With regards to performance, I find that nominating firms have higher 
cumulative stock returns during the fiscal year before the awards than other S&P 500 
firms. This is not surprising given that stock performance is one of the criteria used in the 
initial screening phase for selecting award winners. There are no statistically significant 
differences between the two groups regarding other performance measures. These results, 
in contrast to those of the Malmendier and Tate (2009) study, are consistent with the 
described differences between the CEO awards selection process and the director awards 
selection process. Specifically, public information does not seem to play a significant role 
in the selection of director awards.  
Panel B of Table 2 compares the characteristics of award-winning directors with 
other outside directors on the same boards of nominating companies.
5
 These 
characteristics are measured at the annual meeting of the year before the award. If the 
nominating company no longer exists (due to a sale or a merger), or if the award-winning 
director is no longer with the company (resignation), then I use data from the most recent 
                                                 
4
 Comparison to all public firms, including those not in the S&P 500, does not produce any statistically 
significant differences between the two groups with regards to all performance measures. As expected, in 
this comparison, nominating firms are much larger than non-nominating firms.  
 
5
 In this paper, I use the term “outside directors” to include both independent directors and gray directors. A 
number of awards in my sample are given to gray directors. I do not exclude these directors because in my 
setting, the affiliations may serve as additional incentives for gray directors to contribute efforts above and 
beyond those of independent directors.  
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annual meeting at which the award-winning director is still on the board of the 
nominating firm. I find that award-winning directors are on average older and have 
longer tenure than other outside directors. They are members of more board committees, 
and are more likely to be chairs of those committees. This is not surprising considering 
that leadership roles on board committees afford directors more opportunities to provide 
strong leadership and make significant contributions to firm outcomes, eventually earning 
them recognition of external organizations.  
Interestingly, the percentage of award-winning directors who are also CEOs is 
very close to that of non-winning directors, suggesting that CEO directors do not 
necessarily play an outsized role in influencing the final outcomes at their firms. This is 
consistent with results reported by Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010), who find that 
CEO directors do not have an impact on the firm’s operating performance or the board’s 
decision-making quality. In addition, directors who win awards are usually cited for their 
dedication to going above and beyond the normal duties required of a typical director. 
CEO directors may not have the time or incentives to exert the additional effort necessary 
to be recognized for awards. 
Some other differences between award-winning directors and non-winning 
directors should be noted. Award-winning directors have a higher number of other 
directorships than non-winning directors, 2.31 vs. 1.49 directorships. Including the seat 
on the nominating firm, the majority of award-winning directors can be classified as 
“busy” directors, those with three or more board seats in total. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) find that busy boards – boards dominated by busy directors – are associated with 
lower future firm performance and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance. On 
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the other hand, Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) argue that in certain circumstances 
such as the IPO phase, busy directors can provide an important advising function to the 
firm. This seems to be the case with award-winning directors, as two thirds of the awards 
are given based on advising accomplishments. In addition, because award-winning 
directors tend to have longer tenure than non-winning directors, the appointing CEO is no 
longer in office for 73% of the award-winning directors vs. 60% for the non-winning 
directors. Lastly, ten percent of award-winning directors are gray. While gray directors 
are criticized for having ties to management that may introduce conflicts of interest and 
prevent them from effectively monitoring management, they may also have stronger 
incentives than independent directors to exert significant time and effort to contribute to 
board activities. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL TESTS 
I perform a number of different empirical tests examining the change in board 
seats for award-winning directors during the period after the award, before the award but 
after the director’s accomplishment, and before the accomplishment. The timing of the 
accomplishment is not explicitly stated in the award-winning director’s profile, so I 
examine the press coverage of the events described in the profile to identify the year in 
which these events occur. Typically the accomplishment happens two to three years 
before the award, but in some cases it can occur as far back as 5 years before. When I 
cannot identify specific press coverage of the events in question, I assume that the 
director’s accomplishment occurs two years before the award, relying on the information 
provided to me by the Outstanding Directors Exchange program. Figure 1 illustrates the 
timeline of the director awards process as well as various empirical tests associated with 
each time period. In the following sections, I describe these analyses in more detail. 
4.1. Impact of awards on directors’ reputations 
4.1.1. Univariate change in board seats 
The first test for the ex post settling up hypothesis involves examining the change 
in board seats held by award-winning directors subsequent to receiving awards. As 
awards are announced in the first quarter and annual meetings typically occur in the 
second and third quarters of each year, I use the number of directorships in the year 
before an award (  - 1) as the starting point and measure the abnormal change in 
board seats from this year to two years after the award (  + 2). As shown in Table 2 
Panel B, award winning directors in my sample are older and have a higher number of 
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directorships. To control for downward trends in directorships over time, I follow the 
approach described in Harford (2003) by matching award-winning directors to non-
winning director cohorts based on age and number of directorships at  - 1. In a few 
cases where an exact match could not be obtained, the closest match is selected. For each 
matching cohort, I calculate the median change in board seats from  - 1 to  
+ 2 and subtract this number from the actual change in directorships of award-winning 
directors. The resulting number is the abnormal change in directorships of award-winning 
directors compared to non-winning peers. 
 Table 3 presents the results from two sets of analyses: the first set examines the 
change in total number of board seats including that of nominating firms, whereas the 
second set focuses on other board seats only. As the first set of numbers shows, award-
winning directors gain more board seats than their non-winning peers subsequent to the 
awards. At two years after the awards, award-winning directors will hold, on average, 
0.57 board seats more than their non-winning counterparts. This represents 24% of the 
starting number of directorships at t-1, as shown in row “all directors - % change” of 
Table 3. 
To further understand the drivers of the results, I stratify the sample by age at the 
time of awards, number of prior directorships, type of accomplishments (advising or 
monitoring), and the level of involvement in decision making (member or chair of at least 
2 of the top 3 committees). The results observed for award-winning directors are driven 
by younger directors, since directors 70 years and older in my sample are likely to have 
retired from board service by the time they reach 72, either through voluntary retirement 
or mandatory retirement policies. In addition, the market seems to value directors with 
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strong advising capabilities, as they gain 0.71 additional board seats compared to 0.26 
seats added by directors with monitoring accomplishments. The difference in board seats 
gained by advising directors and monitoring directors seems to support the conjecture 
that management is more open to appointing capable advising directors than intense 
monitoring directors. Another way to gauge the monitoring intensity of a potential 
director is to look at his/her committee memberships, i.e. how many monitoring 
committees of which this director is a member (Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2011). The 
gain in board seats seems to be driven by the subsample of directors who are members or 
chairs of at most one of the top three monitoring committees,
6
 i.e. directors with lower 
monitoring intensity.  
 The second set of numbers presents the abnormal change in other board seats, not 
including that of nominating firms. The results are very similar to those obtained from the 
analysis on total number of board seats. In future tests, I focus on the change in total 
number of board seats, including those of the nominating firms, and report results from 
these analyses only. 
4.1.2. Multivariate regressions with firm fixed effects 
In this section, I address the possibility that the observed results may be driven by 
firm-specific characteristics. Because some directors win awards for their performance in 
mergers and acquisitions activities, the subsequent gain in board seats may be due to 
having acquisition experience rather than winning awards. To control for this possibility, 
I use outside directors on the same boards of nominating firms as the comparison group 
and run a regression analysis with firm fixed effects included.  
                                                 
6
 Audit, compensation, and nominating/corporate governance committees 
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The results are presented in Table 4. The dependent variable is the net change in 
the number of total directorships from  - 1 to  + 2. The key variable of 
interest is an indicator of whether the director is an award-winning director, as well as 
whether the director wins for advising or monitoring. Control variables include director-
specific characteristics and director-firm-specific characteristics that have been shown to 
influence both the retention of board seats as well as change in number of other seats. All 
director-specific characteristics and director-firm-specific characteristics are measured at 
time  - 1. Therefore, directors who are no longer on the boards of nominating 
firms, or the nominating firms no longer exist, at  – 1 are included in specifications 
1 and 2 but not in specifications 3 and 4, which require director-firm characteristics to be 
available. Firm fixed effects are included in all specifications to capture firm-specific 
characteristics that are common to all directors of the same firm: mergers and 
acquisitions activities, past performance, firm size and leverage. These variables are thus 
not explicitly included in the regressions. In all models, standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm level, as recommended by Petersen (2009). 
 In all four specifications, the coefficient estimates suggest that award-winning 
directors enjoy a higher change in subsequent board seats than non-winning directors on 
the same boards, to the order of 0.41 board seats as shown in model 3. Directors who win 
for advising accomplishments tend to gain more board seats than directors who win for 
monitoring, as shown in models 2 and 4. The change in board seats for monitoring 
directors, compared to that of non-winning directors, is positive but not statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with the univariate results reported in Table 3. 
The coefficients on the key control variables are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
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prior studies. Older directors, as well as directors with a high number of prior 
directorships, are more likely to lose more board seats in the future. 
 Collectively, the results presented in Table 3 and 4 are consistent with the ex post 
settling up hypothesis. The magnitude of the estimate is also non-trivial. Yermack (2004) 
reports that one standard deviation in stock return outperformance for two years will lead 
to an expected increase of 0.2 directorships. Coles and Hoi (2003) show that non-
executive directors who reject all anti-takeover provisions experience a subsequent gain 
of 0.17 in external board seats. In this paper, I find that an award-winning director is 
expected to have 0.5 more directorships than non-winning peers on average. To compute 
the economic significance of these results, I use the following assumptions. Since the 
average age of award-winning directors is 63, they have 9 years until retirement on 
average. Assuming that an award-winning director receives compensation of $0.144 
million per year (Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014) and a real discount rate of 3%, I estimate the 
present value of one board seat to be approximately $1.12 million. Given the estimate of 
0.5 additional board seats, the benefit accruing to award-winning directors is in the range 
of $0.56 million. These are not trivial incentives for directors. Adams and Ferreira (2008) 
find that even modest meeting fees ($1,000 per meeting) encourage directors to attend 
board meetings more frequently. They conclude that directors seem to perform even for 
very small financial rewards. Alternatively, directors could be motivated by the social 
standing and recognition of their peers (Dyck and Zingales, 2002), which would provide 
strong motivations to perform and win director awards. 
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4.2. Changes in board seats of award-winning directors before awards 
As I describe the awards selection process in section 2.2, there is a lag between 
when director accomplishments actually occur and when award winners are chosen. As a 
result, it is possible that some of award-winning directors’ accomplishments may have 
already been revealed to other firms, and some directorships may have been offered 
before directors are publicly recognized with awards. To investigate this possibility, I 
examine the change in board seats from one year before the accomplishment to one year 
before the award,  - 1 to  - 1, using the same methodology by matching to 
director cohorts based on age and number of directorships at  - 1. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 5, and they are consistent with the conjecture that 
award-winning directors may have already captured some of the rewards by the time the 
awards are presented. Award-winning directors, on average, enjoy 0.67 more board seats 
than their matched cohorts from  - 1 to  - 1. As a result, the observable gain 
in board seats after receiving awards may underestimate the true effect of the revelation 
of directors’ quality to the labor market. 
4.2.1. Robustness check 
A possible explanation for both the post-awards and pre-awards gain in board 
seats for the award-winning directors is that they are simply higher quality directors 
already known to the market. As a result, they will gain more board seats regardless of 
whether they have won an award or made a significant contribution to the board. To 
address this possibility, I conduct a placebo test by examining the change in board seats 
for award-winning directors in the pre-accomplishment period, specifically from three 
years before the accomplishment to one year before. If the change in board seats is indeed 
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attributable to the director’s accomplishment and award and not simply due to director’s 
quality, then I should not observe any difference in change in board seats between the 
award-winning directors and the matched cohorts during this period. 
 The results in Table B1 of Appendix B provide some evidence that this is the 
case. During this period, the raw abnormal gain in board seats for award-winning 
directors is not statistically significant. The percentage change in board seats is 
significant, however. Many of the subsamples with statistically significant gains reported 
in Table 3 and 5 are now no longer significant (e.g. busy directors and advising 
directors). Interestingly, the change in board seats for monitoring directors during this 
pre-accomplishment period is economically and statistically significant. 
4.3. Stock market reaction to appointments of award-winning directors 
4.3.1. Univariate results 
In section 4.2., I show that award-winning directors gain more board seats prior to 
being publicly recognized with awards, which suggests that the director labor market 
relies on private information for board appointment decisions. To further validate that the 
information is private, I perform an event study of announcements of appointments of 
award-winning directors and matched non-winning directors on the same boards, in the 
period from three years before the accomplishment to four years after the award. Because 
Fich (2005) reports that appointments of CEO directors generate positive and significant 
investor reactions, I match award-winning directors to non-winning directors based on 
CEO status. When there are multiple non-winning directors that fit this criteria, I choose 
the control director closest in age and number of prior directorships. 
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I search the archives of Lexis-Nexis for newspaper articles or news wires that 
announce appointments of award-winning directors and matched non-winning directors. I 
eliminate appointments of directors based on mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, or 
purchases of block holdings. I also eliminate director appointments for which 
announcement dates could not be obtained. In total, I identify 230 announcements that fit 
my selection criteria. I examine investor reactions by estimating cumulative abnormal 
stock returns (CARs) over the (-1,1) event window surrounding the announcement date. 
To estimate market model parameters, I use daily returns from 250 trading days before 
the event to 10 trading days before the event. All daily returns are obtained from the 
CRSP Daily Stock File.  
 I divide the sample of announcements into three distinct time periods: before the 
accomplishment, after the accomplishment but before the award, and after the award. The 
results presented in Table 6 provide supportive evidence that information about director’s 
quality is not publicly revealed before the award. One-sample t-tests of mean CARs and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of median CARs of announcements after the awards produce 
positive and statistically significant estimates, whereas mean CARs and median CARs of 
announcements before the awards are statistically insignificant and close to zero, 
regardless of whether the announcement occurs before or after the accomplishment. With 
regards to the matched non-winning directors, mean CARs and median CARs are either 
negative or close to zero in all three time periods. T-tests of difference in means and 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests of difference in medians between the award-winning 
group and non-winning group reveal that only a statistically significant difference in 
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medians exists in the after-awards period.
7
  The event study evidence supports the idea 
that information about the qualities of award-winning directors is revealed to the broader 
stock market only at the time of the awards. 
4.3.2. Multivariate regressions 
In this section, I include all announcement CARs in a cross sectional regression to 
allow for the inclusion of nominating company fixed effects. The main variables of 
interest are AFTER_AWARD, BEFORE_AWARD_AFTER_ACCOMP, and 
BEFORE_ACCOMP. AFTER_AWARD is an indicator variable, which equals 1 for 
appointments of award-winning directors during the after-award period and 0 otherwise. 
BEFORE_AWARD_AFTER_ACCOMP equals 1 for appointments of award-winning 
directors in the pre-award period but after their accomplishments have occurred. Finally, 
BEFORE_ACCOMP equals 1 for appointments of award-winning directors in the pre-
accomplishment period. Model 1 is an OLS regression without fixed effects included, 
whereas model 2 adds the fixed effects of the nominating companies in the regression. 
 In both model 1 and model 2, only the coefficient on AFTER_AWARD is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The appointment of an award-
winning director generates an additional 1.9% in CARs over the (-1,1) event window for 
the appointing firm, and this impact becomes stronger when fixed effects are added into 
the regression. Award-winning directors, compared to non-winning directors on the same 
board, on average generate 3% more in CARs for the nominating firms. However, in time 
periods before awards, appointments of winning directors do not generate statistically 
different reactions from those of non-winning directors. Taken together, the results 
                                                 
7
 In subsequent iterations, I eliminate announcements that coincide with the release of other major news 
about the appointing firms (including proxy statement filing dates), as well as announcements that include 
multiple director appointments. Statistical inferences remain unchanged and results are not tabulated. 
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shown in Table 5, 6, and 7 suggest that the director labor market is relying on private 
information among fellow directors to hire those who have made significant contributions 
on the boards of other firms. 
4.4. Other measures of career consequences 
4.4.1. Change in committee service 
Besides a change in total board seats, there are other aspects of a director’s 
reputation that could be explored further. In this section, I examine a feature of the 
director labor market not studied previously, change in committee memberships and 
chairmanships. While the prior literature has relied exclusively on the number of 
directorships to study the implications of the director labor market, studying the change 
in directors’ committee service provides several advantages. One advantage is that it 
provides insights into a different dimension of the labor market: existing boards where 
the directors are already a member, versus potential boards looking to add new members. 
Another advantage is that there are fewer frictions in offering and accepting committee 
memberships and chairmanships than in offering and accepting board seats. As a result, 
there may be a faster response time to reputational shocks in changes to committee 
service than in changes to board seats. 
   On the other hand, a disadvantage in using committees is that the costs can 
potentially outweigh the benefits of serving as a committee member or chair. Even 
though some companies do offer additional retainers for serving as members or chairs of 
a committee ($5,000 to $10,000 a year) and attending committee meetings ($500 to 
$1,000 per meeting), the additional meeting time and preparation time may be too costly 
for directors compared to the financial incentives, making them unwilling to accept new 
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assignments of committee service. This constraint in supply may negate the increase in 
demand, leading researchers to observe no change in committee service. Another 
disadvantage, and more pragmatic reason for lack of use in prior studies, is the 
unavailability of data on committee memberships and chairmanships of all board 
committees. A proprietary dataset I have constructed and hand collected from proxy 
statements contains data on members and chairs of all board committees of US public 
companies, enabling me to bypass this problem. 
 For this analysis, I identify all boards that the award-winning directors and non-
winning directors stay on between  - 1 to  + 2. I focus on the boards that 
stay the same during this time period because I want to differentiate the change in 
committees due to existing directorships from the change in committees due to new 
boards being added. The unit of analysis is director-board pair. The dependent variable is 
net change in committee memberships for models 1 and 2 and net change in committee 
chairmanships for models 3 and 4. The key independent variable is an indicator for 
whether the director wins an award, and control variables include director-specific 
characteristics that may influence whether they obtain a new committee. The key controls 
are number of prior committee memberships and number of prior committee 
chairmanships. Directors who are already members or chairs of most committees on the 
board are unlikely to add more, as there are only so many committees on a board (a 
typical board has three to four committees). Nominating company fixed effects are 
included in all specifications to control for firm-specific characteristics. 
 The results of this analysis are documented in Table 8. Despite the small change 
in subsequent number of board seats, monitoring directors seem to gain more committee 
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memberships than advising directors, suggesting that their services are valued by firms in 
which they already serve as board members. The coefficients on other variables of 
interest are positive but not statistically significant. This is not surprising given what I 
report in Table 2 Panel B: award-winning directors already serve on a higher number of 
committees at nominating firms, thus they may be limited in the number of committees or 
chairmanships that they can add.  
4.4.2. Size of the appointing firms 
Masulis and Mobbs (2014) argue that firm size plays an important role in 
providing incentives for directors to perform. They find that directors are significantly 
less likely to miss board meetings at relatively larger firms in their portfolio of 
directorships. In addition, firms with a greater proportion of directors who would rank 
this directorship highly (measured by size) tend to have better operating performance and 
board decision-making quality. In this section, I investigate whether award-winning 
directors are able to join larger firms, and thus increase their visibility and prestige, after 
they win awards. 
 To conduct this analysis, I start with computing the average size of all firms in the 
portfolio of directorships held by award-winning directors and non-winning directors, 
from one year before the awards to two years after. The advantages of using an average 
size measure are twofold: first, it not only captures the new board seats added but also the 
seats lost, and second, it is independent of the higher number of seats added by award-
winning directors. If these new seats are on boards of smaller size companies, the average 
size of all firms in the award-winner’s portfolio would be smaller than before, even if he 
or she may be gaining more board seats in total.  
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 I use log of market capitalization and log of total assets as a measure of firm size, 
and I compute a ratio of average firm size two years after the award over average firm 
size one year before the award. These ratios are used as the dependent variables in fixed 
effect regressions to assess whether award-winning directors are able to capitalize on the 
reputational shock and join the boards of larger firms. Directors who have no board seats 
at one year before the award or at two years after are not included in the regressions. 
Table 9 presents the results of these regressions. Nominating company fixed effects are 
included to control for firm-specific characteristics. Year fixed effects are included to 
control for time trends that may affect changes in firms’ market capitalization. Models 1 
and 2 use the ratio of log of market cap as the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4 
use the ratio of log of total assets as the dependent variable. The coefficient on award-
winning directors is positive in both models 1 and 3, but only significant in model 3. On 
the other hand, the coefficient on advising directors is positive in both model 2 and 4 but 
only significant in model 2. While the statistical significance of the results is weak, they 
still suggest that award-winning directors, especially those who win for advising, are able 
to join relatively larger firms after the win. 
4.4.3. Change in percent of votes withheld  
Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) utilize another measure of director’s reputation, 
votes withheld, to study the response of the labor market to a negative reputation shock – 
option backdating scandals. They find that the percentage of votes withheld is twice as 
high for option-backdating directors than for similar directors at non-option-backdating 
firms. This percentage of votes withheld is highest for directors who sit on the 
compensation committee, which is responsible for allowing backdated options. The 
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results indicate that vote support can be used as a mechanism to penalize poor performing 
directors, possibly preventing them from being re-elected. 
 However, it is unclear whether shareholders would vote for or against award-
winning directors. These directors are typically busy directors with multiple board seats, 
and as such they may earn a “withhold” recommendation from the proxy advisory firm 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). In a recent paper, Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch 
(2014) examine the determinants of director election results. They find that ISS 
recommendations play a very influential role in impacting the number of votes withheld 
or against a particular director. On the other hand, they also find that ISS does not pay as 
much attention to a number of issues that matter more to firm value, such as the director’s 
skill set or his/her advising capability, as these issues are difficult for ISS to evaluate and 
make a recommendation. 
 To study the implications of awards on shareholder votes, I utilize the voting 
records provided by Voting Analytics from 2003 to 2011. I merge each award-winning 
director and non-winning directors on that same board to four years of vote results, from 
two years before the award to two years after. I use a difference-in-differences 
specification to estimate the impact of the award on shareholder votes. The dependent 
variable for model 1 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the ISS issues a “withhold” 
recommendation. Model 2 examines the percentage of votes “withheld” or “against” the 
director, and model 3 uses the percentage of votes “for” the director. The main variable 
of interest here is the interaction term between an indicator variable for award-winning 
directors and an indicator variable for the period after the awards.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term is the difference-in-differences effect, and in all three specifications its 
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magnitude is small and not statistically significant. Interestingly, holding more board 
seats leads to higher probability of an ISS “withhold” recommendation, a higher 
percentage of votes “withheld” or “against” the director, and a lower percentage of votes 
“for.” The results here are consistent with the argument that a director’s quality or skill 
set is not a focus for ISS recommendations, and thus director awards have a negligible 
impact on shareholder votes.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Prior studies have documented a well-functioning market for directorships, which 
penalizes directors who fail to act as proper monitors of management. However, the 
evidence on whether the market rewards directors for exceptional performances is scant. 
It is important to understand whether adequate incentives exist for outside directors to 
allocate extra time and effort into monitoring and advising management. In this paper, I 
use director awards as a setting to study the implications of the “reward” side of the 
director labor market. I find that award-winning directors indeed gain more board seats 
subsequent to receiving awards, compared to cohorts matched on age and number of prior 
directorships and compared to fellow outside directors on the same boards. I also find 
that award-winning directors gain more board seats during the pre-award period, whereas 
appointments of these directors only generate positive investor reactions in the post-
award period. The results suggest that the director labor market relies on private 
information among fellow directors to make board appointment decisions. This is a 
potentially important channel of information in the labor market nor previously explored 
in the literature. More work is needed to better understand the inner workings of this 
labor market. 
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APPENDIX A 
FIGURE AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Timeline of the director awards selection process 
This figure illustrates the timeline of the director awards selection process and the various empirical tests performed over 
different time periods. For the timing of the director’s accomplishment, I examine the press coverage of the events described 
by the director’s profile and identify the year in which these events occur. Typically this accomplishment occurs two to three 
years before the award year, but sometimes it can go as far back as five years before. 
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Table 1A: Sample size from 1999 to 2009 
This table details the total number of awards given by the Outstanding Directors 
Exchange and the National Association of Corporate Directors, as well as the filters I use 
to obtain the final sample used in this study. 
 
Sample and filters Number 
of awards 
Total number of awards given by NACD and ODX 121 
NACD lifetime achievement awards 3 
Directors who passed away in the year of or the year after the award 3 
Directors who receive a second award 2 
Directors who are or were CEOs of nominating companies 5 
Directors who retired from all board service by the year before the award 2 
Directors whose accomplishments could not be obtained 15 
Directors whose nominating companies do not have available data 2 
Total awards in final sample 89 
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Table 1B: Accomplishments cited in the awards 
This table describes the primary reasons that outstanding directors are chosen for awards by the Outstanding Directors 
Exchange and the National Association of Corporate Directors. For the award announcements that do not state the directors’ 
accomplishments explicitly, I read the accompanying director profile and obtain the most significant contribution of the 
director described in the profile and attributed by fellow board members. 
 
Category Number of 
awards 
Percent of 
total 
Advising or 
Monitoring 
Leading the company through difficult times, restructurings, and 
turnarounds 
17 19% Advising 
Driving successful spin-offs, mergers, or acquisitions 12 13% Advising 
Managing an effective CEO succession or CEO hiring process 8 9% Monitoring 
Introducing good corporate governance practices 8 9% Monitoring 
Providing a particular set of expertise or knowledge 8 9% Advising 
Providing strategic vision and advice 7 8% Advising 
Improving financial reporting and disclosures, or serving as a strong audit 
committee chair 
7 8% Monitoring 
Strong leadership of the board 5 6% Advising 
Strengthening executive compensation programs 4 4% Monitoring 
Scientific or technological expertise 3 3% Advising 
Intellectual ability, analytical focus 3 3% Advising 
Consensus building skills 3 3% Advising 
Extensive international experience 2 2% Advising 
Political background and understanding of inner workings of the 
government 
2 2% Advising 
Total 89 100%  
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
Panel A: Comparison of nominating firms and non-nominating S&P 500 firms 
This panel reports the mean values of characteristics of nominating firms and non-nominating firms in the S&P 500. All firm 
variables (except where specified) are measured as of the most recent fiscal year-end date before the award announcements. 
Book leverage is measured as long-term debt plus short-term debt, scaled by total assets. Market leverage is measured as long-
term debt plus short-term debt, scaled by total assets minus book equity plus market equity. Tobin’s Q is total assets minus 
book equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income, scaled by total assets. 
Fiscal-year stock returns are cumulative 12-month stock returns during the most recent fiscal year before the awards.  The table 
reports the p-values of tests of differences in means between characteristics of nominating firms and those of non-nominating 
firms. ***, **, and * represent significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Nominating firms  Non-nominating firms  p-values 
 Mean  N  Mean  N  T-test 
Market capitalization  34,211  86   20,918   5,909   0.064* 
Assets   45,456  87   39,864   5,912   0.642 
Sales   22,336  87   13,871   5,915   0.132 
Book leverage  0.28 87  0.25  5,893   0.160 
Market leverage 0.17 86  0.17  5,890   0.915 
Tobin’s Q 2.49 86  2.07  5,909   0.268 
ROA 0.15 85  0.14  5,801   0.515 
ROA – 2 years before awards 0.14 85  0.14  5,799   0.707 
ROA – 3 years before awards 0.13 85  0.15  5,786   0.391 
Fiscal-year stock returns 0.32 86  0.09  5,866   0.070* 
Fiscal-year stock returns – 2 years before awards 0.20 85  0.18  5,819   0.624 
Fiscal-year stock returns – 3 years before awards 0.24 84  0.22  5,760   0.694 
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Panel B: Comparison of award-winning directors and non-winning outside directors on the same nominating firms 
This table reports mean values of the characteristics of award-winning directors on the boards of nominating companies, 
compared to other outside directors on the same boards. These characteristics are measured at the annual meeting one year 
before the awards are given. If the nominating companies no longer exist (due to a sale or a merger), or if the award winning 
director is no longer at the nominating company (due to resignation), then these characteristics are measured at the most recent 
annual meeting before the awards that the award-winning directors are still on the boards of the nominating companies. The 
table reports the p-values of tests of differences in means between characteristics of award-winning directors and those of other 
outside directors on the same boards. ***, **, and * represent significance level at the 1*, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Award-winning 
directors 
 Outside directors on the 
same nominating 
companies 
 
p-values 
 Mean  N  Mean  N  T-test 
Age 63.09 89  61.26 787  0.026** 
Tenure 9.43 89  7.48 787  0.013** 
Director is a current CEO 0.13 89  0.13 787  0.808 
Director is female 0.20 89  0.18 787  0.572 
Director is gray 0.10 89  0.10 787  0.928 
Appointing CEO no longer in office 0.73 89  0.60 787  0.019** 
Number of other board seats 2.31 89  1.49 787  0.000*** 
Number of committee chairmanships 0.80 89  0.33 787  0.000*** 
Number of committee memberships 2.36 89  1.94 787  0.000*** 
Member of audit committee 0.38 89  0.45 787  0.242 
Chair of audit committee 0.11 89  0.09 787  0.588 
Member of executive committee 0.37 89  0.17 787  0.000*** 
Chair of executive committee 0.06 89  0.01 787  0.000*** 
Member of compensation committee 0.47 89  0.41 787  0.264 
Chair of compensation committee 0.25 89  0.07 787  0.000*** 
Member of nominating/governance committee 0.58 89  0.42 787  0.005*** 
Chair of nominating/governance committee 0.17 89  0.08 787  0.011** 
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Table 3: Abnormal change in number of directorships for award-winning directors 
This table reports the abnormal change in the number of directorships for award-winning 
directors from one year before the award to two years after. Following Harford (2003), 
each award-winning director is matched to a cohort of non-winning directors based on 
age and number of starting directorships. The abnormal change is calculated by 
subtracting the median 3-year change in board seats of the matching cohort from the 
actual change in board seats of the award-winning director. Statistically significant 
estimates are highlighted in bold. ***, **, and * represent significance level at the 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Abnormal change 
– including seats 
at nominating 
firms N   
Abnormal 
change – 
other seats 
only N 
All directors – raw change 0.573*** 89  0.567*** 89 
 (4.10)   (5.07)  
All directors – % change 0.240*** 89  0.266*** 77 
 (4.05)   (3.86)  
Directors 70 years and older 0.184 19  0.395* 19 
 (0.72)   (2.00)  
Directors 69 years and younger 0.679*** 70  0.614*** 70 
 (4.18)   (4.66)  
Directors 65 years and older 0.510** 49  0.510*** 49 
 (2.56)   (3.26)  
Directors 64 years and younger 0.650*** 40  0.638*** 40 
 (3.33)   (3.98)  
Directors with 2 or fewer 
directorships at t-1 
0.533** 30 
 
0.510*** 51 
 (2.57)   (3.48)  
Directors with 3 or more directorships 
at t-1 
0.593*** 59 
 
0.645*** 38 
 (3.23)   (3.69)  
Directors whose awards are based on  
advising accomplishment 
0.710*** 62  0.677*** 62 
(3.87)   (4.81)  
Directors whose awards are based on  
monitoring accomplishment 
0.259 27  0.315* 27 
(1.46)   (1.84)  
Directors are members or chairs of at 
most 1 of the top 3 monitoring 
committees  
0.735*** 49  0.622*** 49 
(3.73)  
 
(4.26)  
Directors are members or chairs of at 
least 2 of the top 3 monitoring 
committees 
0.375* 40  0.500*** 40 
(1.92)  
 
(2.87)  
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Table 4: Regression analysis of the net change in total public company directorships 
of award-winning directors, compared to outside directors on the same boards 
This table contains estimates from a fixed effects regression of the change in total 
directorships from one year before to two years after the award for the award-winning 
directors and non-winning outside directors on the same boards of nominating 
companies. Director characteristics are measured at one year before the award. Directors 
who are no longer on the nominating companies, or whose nominating companies no 
longer exist, are included in models 1 and 2 but not models 3 and 4. In models 3 and 4, 
additional control variables are included. These controls are director’s tenure, indicator 
variable for whether the director is a gray director, indicator for whether the director is a 
member of the audit committee, indicator for compensation committee membership, 
indicator for nominating or governance committee membership, and indicator for 
whether the director chairs any committee. Nominating company fixed effects are 
included in the regression. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level. 
 
 Dependent variable is the change in total 
directorships from year -1 to year +2 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Director who wins an award 0.414***  0.364**  
 (2.74)  (2.16)  
Director who wins for advising  0.330**  0.286* 
  (2.40)  (1.91) 
Director who wins for monitoring  0.202  0.102 
  (0.71)  (0.33) 
Director is a CEO 0.265 0.273 0.203 0.217 
 (1.48) (1.53) (1.11) (1.20) 
Director age -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 
 (-1.23) (-1.12) (-1.48) (-1.40) 
Director age 70 and above -0.467** -0.481** -0.587*** -0.603*** 
 (-2.33) (-2.38) (-2.76) (-2.82) 
Director age 65 to 69 -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.386*** -0.385*** 
 (-3.05) (-3.03) (-2.81) (-2.79) 
Director is female 0.124 0.131 0.095 0.104 
 (1.15) (1.20) (0.85) (0.92) 
Number of prior directorships -0.182*** -0.178*** -0.174*** -0.170*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.69) (-3.39) (-3.33) 
Other controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Constant 2.054*** 2.045*** 0.449 0.431 
 (4.56) (4.55) (0.79) (0.76) 
Robust SEs clustered at firm level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 877 877 803 803 
R-squared 0.228 0.322 0.247 0.327 
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Table 5: Abnormal change in number of directorships for award-winning directors 
before the awards 
This table reports the abnormal change in the number of directorships for award-winning 
directors from one year before the accomplishment to one year before the award. Each 
award-winning director is matched to a cohort of non-winning directors based on age and 
number of starting directorships. The abnormal change is calculated by subtracting the 
median change in board seats of the matching cohort from the actual change in board 
seats of the award-winning director. Statistically significant estimates are highlighted in 
bold. ***, **, and * represent significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Abnormal change – 
including seats at 
nominating 
companies N  
All directors – raw change 0.673*** 84 
 (5.02)  
All directors – % change 0.338*** 84 
 (4.99)  
Directors 70 years and older 0.559** 17 
 (2.61)  
Directors 69 years and younger 0.701*** 67 
 (4.40)  
Directors 65 years and older 0.404** 47 
 (2.42)  
Directors 64 years and younger 1.014*** 37 
 (4.89)  
Directors with 2 or fewer directorships at t-3 -0.08 25 
 (-0.53)  
Directors with 3 or more directorships at t-3 0.992*** 59 
 (6.07)  
Directors whose awards are based on advising 
accomplishment 
0.675*** 57 
 (3.86)  
Directors whose awards are based on monitoring 
accomplishment 
0.667*** 27 
 (3.37)  
Directors are members or chairs of at most 1 of the top 
3 monitoring committees  
0.542*** 48 
 (2.98)  
Directors are members or chairs of at least 2 of the top 
3 monitoring committees 
0.847*** 36 
 (4.30)  
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Table 6: Investor reactions to appointments of award-winning directors 
This table shows the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) associated with announcements of appointments of award-
winning directors and non-winning directors on the same boards, closest matches based on CEO status, age, and number of 
prior directorships. The timings of the appointments range from before the actual accomplishments to after the awards. Press 
announcements are obtained from the Lexis-Nexis news archives. Market model parameters are estimated from 250 trading 
days before the event date to 10 days before the event date. I report both the mean CARs and median CARs for the 3-day 
announcement period (-1, 1). Reported in parentheses next to estimates are p-values from two-tailed t-tests for means and two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests for medians. For tests of difference between the means and medians of two samples, 
appointment announcements after awards and before awards, I use the t-test for difference between means and the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test for difference between medians. T-statistic and Wilcoxon Z-statistic are reported, as well as p-values in 
parentheses. 
 
  
Award-winning 
directors  
Non-winning 
directors  
Test statistic for 
dif. b/w means and 
medians 
Director appointments after awards      
 Mean CAR 1.70%** (0.02)  -0.11% (0.95)  1.08 (0.28) 
 Median CAR 0.93%***(0.00)  -1.49% (0.04)**  3.25*** (0.00) 
 Number of observations 34  27   
 Percentage of CARs with positive values 76%  26%   
       
Director appointments before awards but after accomplishments 
 Mean CAR 0.71% (0.60)  -0.02% (0.98)  0.52 (0.61) 
 Median CAR 0.04% (0.57)  -0.21% (0.98)  0.42 (0.68) 
 Number of observations 27  33   
 Percentage of CARs with positive values 52%  42%   
       
Director appointments before accomplishments 
 Mean CAR -0.08% (0.93)  -0.29% (0.67)  0.20 (0.84) 
 Median CAR -0.22% (0.26)  -0.23% (0.80)  0.29 (0.77) 
 Number of observations 48  61   
 Percentage of CARs with positive values 46%  48%   
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Table 7: Cross-sectional regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding 
director appointments 
This table contains estimates from an OLS regression of cumulative abnormal returns 
over the event window (-1,1) surrounding the appointments of award-winning directors 
and non-winning directors. Non-winning directors are on the same boards of award-
winning directors and matched based on CEO status, age, and number of prior 
directorships. AFTER_AWARD is an indicator variable, which equals 1 for 
appointments of award-winning directors during the after-award period and 0 otherwise. 
BEFORE_AWARD_AFTER_ACCOMP equals 1 for appointments of award-winning 
directors in the pre-award period but after their accomplishments have occurred. 
BEFORE_ACCOMP equals 1 for appointments of award-winning directors in the pre-
accomplishment period. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics. 
 
 Dependent variable is the cumulative 
abnormal returns over window (-1,1) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
AFTER_AWARD 0.019** 0.030** 
 (2.19) (2.37) 
BEFORE_AWARD_AFTER_ACCOMP 0.009 0.009 
 (0.62) (0.58) 
BEFORE_ACCOMP 0.001 0.004 
 (0.10) (0.27) 
Constant -0.002 0.024 
 (-0.33) (1.65) 
Nominating company fixed effects No Yes 
Robust SEs  Yes Yes 
Observations 230 230 
R-squared 0.013 0.381 
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Table 8: Regression analysis of the net change in number of committee 
memberships and chairmanships of award-winning directors 
This table contains estimates from a fixed effect regression of the change in number of 
committee memberships and chairmanships from one year before award to two years 
after award for winning directors, compared to non-winning outside directors on the same 
boards. Director characteristics are measured at one year before. Nominating company 
fixed effects are included in the regression. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. Reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics. 
 
 Dependent variable is 
net change in number of 
committee memberships 
 Dependent variable is 
net change in number 
of committee 
chairmanships 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
      
Director who wins an award 0.088   0.029  
 (1.48)   (0.74)  
Director who wins for advising  0.037   0.052 
  (0.55)   (1.19) 
Director who wins for monitoring  0.265***   0.038 
  (2.86)   (0.54) 
Director is a CEO -0.100* -0.114*  -0.028 -0.027 
 (-1.67) (-1.88)  (-0.72) (-0.69) 
Director age -0.002 -0.002  -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.45) (-0.35)  (-0.93) (-0.95) 
Director age 70 and above -0.010 -0.016  -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.10) (-0.16)  (-0.03) (-0.03) 
Director age 65 to 69 -0.056 -0.063  -0.054 -0.054 
 (-0.86) (-0.97)  (-1.27) (-1.26) 
Director is female 0.039 0.041  -0.053 -0.053 
 (0.71) (0.74)  (-1.48) (-1.48) 
Director tenure 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.16) (1.25)  (-0.65) (-0.65) 
Number of prior committee 
memberships 
-0.450*** -0.452***  0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (-16.01) (-16.05)  (3.56) (3.52) 
Number of prior committee 
chairmanships 
-0.031 -0.037  -0.545*** -0.546*** 
 (-0.69) (-0.82)  (-16.94) (-16.92) 
Constant 1.916*** 1.885***  0.811 0.816 
 (3.09) (3.04)  (1.32) (1.33) 
Observations 1423 1423  1423 1423 
R-squared 0.323 0.325  0.279 0.279 
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Table 9: Regression analysis of change in size of firms in award-winning director’s 
portfolio of board seats 
This table contains estimates from a fixed effect regression of the relative change in firm 
size from one year before the award to two years after. Directors who have no board seats 
one year before the award or two years after are not included in the regression. The 
dependent variable used in models 1 and 2 is the ratio of average firm size two years after 
award over average firm size one year before, measured by log of market cap. Models 3 
and 4 use a similarly defined dependent variable, except that size is measured by log of 
total assets instead of market cap. Director characteristics are measured at one year 
before. Nominating company fixed effects are included in the regression. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Reported in parentheses are robust t-
statistics. 
 
 Dependent variable is 
ratio of log of market 
cap  
 Dependent variable is 
ratio of log of total 
assets 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
      
Director who wins an award 0.017   0.033**  
 (1.41)   (2.29)  
Director who wins for advising  0.024*   0.023 
  (1.75)   (1.38) 
Director who wins for monitoring  -0.016   0.021 
  (-0.99)   (0.98) 
Director is a CEO 0.023** 0.026**  0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (2.16) (2.34)  (2.75) (2.66) 
Director age -0.000 -0.000  -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.47) (-0.39)  (-0.84) (-0.74) 
Director age 70 and above -0.127*** -0.129***  -0.141*** -0.141*** 
 (-4.64) (-4.68)  (-4.76) (-4.74) 
Director age 65 to 69 -0.006 -0.006  0.003 0.003 
 (-0.54) (-0.53)  (0.21) (0.20) 
Director is female 0.007 0.008  0.011 0.011 
 (0.82) (0.87)  (1.04) (1.07) 
Director tenure -0.000 -0.000  -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.64) (-0.58)  (-1.38) (-1.31) 
Constant 1.074*** 1.074***  1.103*** 1.099*** 
 (16.44) (16.65)  (21.74) (21.71) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust SEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 714 714  714 714 
R-squared 0.376 0.378  0.306 0.303 
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Table 10: Regression of votes withheld between award winning directors and non-
winning directors on the same boards 
This table contains regression estimates of voting support for award-winning directors 
compared with non-winning directors on the same boards. For model 1, the dependent 
variable is an indicator for whether ISS has issued a “withhold” recommendation for this 
director in this year. For model 2, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes 
“withheld” or “against” the director over the total number of votes cast. For model 3, the 
dependent variable is the percentage of votes “for” the director over the total number of 
votes cast. Director characteristics are measured at one year before. Nominating company 
fixed effects are included in the regression. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. Reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics. 
 
 Dependent variable is: 
VARIABLES Indicator 
variable=1 when 
ISS 
recommendation 
is “withhold” 
Percentage of 
votes 
“withheld” or 
“against” the 
director 
Percentage of 
votes “for” 
the director 
Director who wins an award -0.003 0.011 -0.001 
 (-0.14) (1.29) (-0.10) 
Indicator =1 if vote is on or after 
the award year 
0.054*** 0.006 -0.003 
 (2.59) (1.19) (-0.34) 
Interaction term -0.022 -0.008 -0.010 
 (-0.94) (-0.85) (-0.81) 
Director is a CEO 0.063*** 0.016*** -0.017 
 (3.07) (2.65) (-1.45) 
Director age 0.002* 0.001** -0.000 
 (1.77) (2.12) (-0.62) 
Director age 70 and above -0.038 -0.004 0.017 
 (-1.29) (-0.56) (1.27) 
Director age 65 to 69 -0.010 -0.010** 0.006 
 (-0.57) (-2.27) (0.73) 
Director is female -0.011 -0.004 0.002 
 (-0.83) (-1.05) (0.33) 
Director tenure 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.16) (-1.10) (-0.79) 
Number of board seats 0.017*** 0.003*** -0.008*** 
 (3.16) (3.00) (-3.11) 
Constant 0.356 -0.009 -0.052 
 (1.19) (-0.39) (-1.48) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SEs  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1966 1904 1895 
R-squared 0.118 0.134 0.159 
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 
Table B1: Abnormal change in number of directorships for award-winning 
directors before the actual accomplishment 
This table reports the abnormal change in the number of directorships for award-winning 
directors from three years before to one year before the actual accomplishment. Each 
award-winning director is matched to a cohort of non-winning directors based on age and 
number of directorships three years before the accomplishment. The abnormal change is 
calculated by subtracting the median 2-year change in board seats of the matching cohort 
from the actual change in board seats of the award-winning director. Statistically 
significant estimates are highlighted in bold. ***, **, and * represent significance level at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Abnormal change – 
including seats at 
nominating companies N  
All directors – raw change 0.237 76 
 (1.51)  
All directors – % change 0.161** 76 
 (2.32)  
Directors 70 years and older 0.176 17 
 (0.48)  
Directors 69 years and younger 0.254 59 
 (1.46)  
Directors 65 years and older 0.133 45 
 (0.57)  
Directors 64 years and younger 0.387** 31 
 (2.18)  
Directors with 2 or fewer directorships at t-1 0.323* 31 
 (1.83)  
Directors with 3 or more directorships at t-1 0.178 45 
 (0.75)  
Directors whose awards are based on advising 
accomplishment 
0.115 52 
 (0.56)  
Directors whose awards are based on monitoring 
accomplishment 
0.500** 24 
 (2.30)  
Directors are members or chairs of at most 1 of the 
top 3 monitoring committees  
0.167 42 
 (0.80)  
Directors are members or chairs of at least 2 of the 
top 3 monitoring committees 
0.324 34 
 (1.33)  
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